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A Judiciary as Good
as Its Promise
I was greatly impressed by one recent
article in Court Review.  The article by
Judge Kevin S. Burke (“A Court and a
Judiciary That Is as Good as Its Promise,”
Summer 2003) was so inspiring that I
photocopied it and put it on our bulletin
board.
Weldon Copeland, Judge




In response to Roger Hanson’s Winter
2002 article (“The Changing Role of a
Judge and its Implications”), a different
perspective is herewith submitted.
When judges step out of their tradi-
tional role as interpreter of the plain
meaning of the law and apply it strictly to
the facts in an instant case, they invite
justifiable criticism.  Consideration of
socially desirable consequences are better
left to the other branches of government.
Changing roles of judges, creation of new
types of courts, becoming partners with
social agencies to resolve social maladies
can only dilute the court’s effectiveness
and make it merely another social agency.
Contrary to current thought, judges at
the trial level become intimately involved
with the knowledge of litigants and their
circumstances through the evidence pre-
sented in court.  This is a forum unlike
the social agency, which receives much
biased and self-serving information that
often is unchallenged and accepted as
fact.
Has the role of judges and the judi-
ciary changed since the establishment of
the Constitution of the United States?
The Constitution provides separate, but
not necessarily equal branches of the fed-
eral government.  In logical sequence, it
provides in Article I a legislature to make
laws; Article II an executive to enforce
laws; and Article III a judiciary to inter-
pret and apply the laws.
Legislative law is created and enforced
by the Executive Branch without interfer-
ence of the judiciary, with some notable
exceptions.  Laws that are unconstitu-
tional or executed in violation of the
Constitution are set aside by the judi-
ciary.  Interpretation and application of
the law when challenged in a court of
jurisdiction is the proper function of the
judiciary.
There are those both in and out of the
legal community who believe it is the
judge’s role to adapt the law to changing
circumstances and technologies, to con-
sider socially desired consequences in
resolving specific disputes.  They deny
the brilliance of our founding fathers,
who provided no such thing with their
Constitution.  In their foresight, they
established a government and a constitu-
tion that withstands time, changing cir-
cumstances, and technologies.  They
have even provided for amendment of
this Constitution for a new and different
one if we desire it and have the courage
and fortitude of such beliefs.
For the first 150 years of our country,
the judges confined themselves to inter-
preting the plain meaning of the law and
applying it strictly to the facts in an
instant case.  This has been called exer-
cising judicial restraint, which is a mis-
nomer since judges were thoroughly
exercising the powers granted by the
Constitution.  The courts were respected
as the final word on the law and judges in
general were held in high esteem.  The
law was certain and business dealings
could rely on it, because precedents were
given their just value and seldom over-
turned.
In the last 50 years, judges have
turned away from their prior established
principles and entered the fields of mak-
ing law and reaching for socially accept-
able results.  Judges have stretched the
plain language of the law to impose their
beliefs in what may seem popular or
desirable ways.
Those who are unable to convince the
legislature that the people will buy their
special interest have found a weakness in
the government—the judiciary.  Why try
to convince Congress of a cause when a
judge or judges already bent in your
direction may willingly exceed the writ-
ten law to attain the desired social result?
As a result, judges have become judi-
cial activists disregarding the precedent
and plain meaning of the law to obtain a
socially desirable result.  More cases are
now filed.  More meaningless and frivo-
lous lawsuits are filed in the hope that a
trial judge or a majority of appellate
judges will determine that the end result
justifies the means, even if it means
stretching or disregarding the law.
If a statute or law is unacceptable, the
court should properly point it out and
recommend its change, but enforce it
until it is properly changed.  Activism for
social change is a proper and needed
function for the legislative and executive
branches of government, but not the
judiciary.  Judges and the forum of the
court should not be the vehicle for pro-
moting social change, no matter how
desirable.
Respect for the courts is diminished
when controversial social changes are
promoted.  Because judges vacillate on
applying the law, the law is no longer
constant.  Thus, the trial court proceed-
ing, whether by judge or jury, is no longer
honored.  Participants in the court sys-
tem just consider it as the first required
procedure to obtain their desired result.
They intend to appeal until a judge or
court in the state or federal system will
find in their favor.
Appellate judges should be looking to
uphold the trial court or jury decision
unless there has been a severe misappli-
cation of the law.  Appellate judges
should not proceed as if the case were
presented to them on first impression and
disregard or hold little respect for the
decision of the trier of fact.
Only those cases that are clearly
unconstitutional or in which gross error
has been committed should be overruled.
Appellate judges should not substitute
their discretion for that of the trial judge.
Analyzing the roles set forth in Roger
Hanson’s article, judges should be adjudi-
cators, emphasizing deciding cases.  In so
doing, they should be law interpreters,
not law makers, and should adhere to the
Constitution.  It goes without saying that
judges should expedite cases and manage
them in an efficient manner.  Justice
delayed is no justice at all.
The judge is not a mediator, peace-
keeper, or policy maker.  He is a law
interpreter who decides cases.  Who
wants to change the role of a judge?  
Continued on page 24
62 Court Review - Summer 2004
 
